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reduced labor cost implies the firms retain a greater portion of the gain from a productivity shock, which gives
them a greater incentive to create vacancies. Simulations show that a working capital requirement does indeed
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1. Introduction
The influential work of Shimer (2005) has motivated many researchers to explore the cyclical properties
of the search-and-matching model. Shimer argues that Nash bargaining, the wage determination mechanism
in the textbook search models, generates wage changes that largely absorb the gains and losses accrued
to firms from labor productivity shocks. The consequence is that the firms are left with little incentive to
adjust employment in response to these shocks, which in turn leads to muted responses of key labor market
variables.
Following Shimer’s commentary, many researchers have begun to examine the wage setting mechanism in
greater detail. Hall (2005) argues that any wage in the bargaining set should be considered as a solution to the
bargaining problem and offers a number of wage rules that vary in their degrees of rigidity. Hall and Milgrom
(2008) do not consider walking away from a negotiation to be a credible threat in the bargaining problem.
They argue the threat point of the bargaining process is the value of delay, not the outside options; this
makes labor market conditions, including labor productivity, less influential on the wage bargaining process.
Gertler and Trigari (2009) propose a staggered wage contracting model—employers and employees use Nash
bargaining to determine wages, but only periodically. The rigid wage features of these models weaken the
dependence of wages on labor productivity and allow the search models to generate more fluctuations in
unemployment and vacancy.
However, other researchers, including Pissarides (2009), Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2013), and
Kudlyak (2014), have pointed out that job creation in the search models is influenced by the expected net
present value of wages of new matches. They further show that the wages of new hires are much more
procyclical than the average wage. Based on this evidence, they conclude that wage rigidity is unlikely to
be the answer to the unemployment volatility puzzle.
In this paper, I retain a flexible wage setting mechanism while incorporating monopolistic competition
and a working capital requirement in an otherwise standard search-and-matching model. My treatment of
monopolistic competition is largely modeled after Krause and Lubik (2007)—the monopolistic competitive
intermediate good producers employ workers from a frictional labor market and are subject to a price
adjustment cost. The working capital requirement introduces the nominal interest rate as a component of
the labor cost.1 In this environment, a positive labor productivity shock lowers the real marginal cost of
production and lowers inflation. The monetary authority, which follows an interest rate rule, lowers the
interest rate in response to changes in the price level. A lower nominal interest rate partially offsets the
increase in wage from higher labor productivity. This reduces the labor cost and implies that the firms retain
a greater portion of the gain from productivity shock as profits, thus giving the firms a greater incentive to
create more vacancies.
To evaluate the quantitative properties of the model, I calibrate and simulate the model. I find that
a working capital requirement does indeed improve the ability of the model to address the unemployment
volatility puzzle. Relative to the textbook search-and-matching model, a working capital requirement delivers
a 78 percent increase in unemployment volatility, a 63 percent increase in vacancy volatility, and a 74
percent increase in market tightness volatility. The unemployment volatility now reaches 81 percent of
the OLS regression coefficient where unemployment is the dependent variable and labor productivity is the
independent variable.2 The relative standard deviation of vacancy overshoots the OLS target at 147 percent.
The market tightness volatility is at 106 percent of the OLS regression coefficient. Moreover, the model either
maintains or improves the autocorrelations and the correlations among the labor market variables relative
to the textbook search-and-matching model; these statistics are in line with their empirical counterparts.
Given that the interest rate rule and monopolistic competition are not common features of the search model,
I conduct a series of sensitivity analyses. I find the quantitative results of the model are robust to a wide
range of specifications.
1Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Cooley and Quadrini (2004) also include a working capital requirement in their treatment
of the frictional labor market. However, the main differences with this paper are that they adopt a money growth rule and that
their focus is the model’s response to monetary shocks.
2Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007a) point out that the appropriate measure of the elasticities of the labor market variables
with respect to labor productivity is the OLS regression coefficient since labor productivity is but one of the driving forces in
the real world.
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In addition to the literature mentioned above, this paper is related to a long line of research exploring the
unemployment volatility puzzle. Among others, Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007a) provide a detailed survey
of the literature on the puzzle and point out that a more realistically calibrated version of the model which
incorporates a simplified version of the Hall and Milgrom (2008) strategic bargaining setup can account for
two-thirds of the observed volatility in vacancy-unemployment ratio. Krause and Lubik (2006) examine an
environment in which workers are allowed to move from “bad” to “good” jobs. Nagypa´l (2007) studies an on-
the-job search model with a hiring cost where jobs differ in their levels of amenities; she finds the interaction of
on-the-job search and a hiring cost allows the model to replicate all of the observed volatility in unemployment
and vacancy rates. Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007b) show that allowing endogenous separation can improve
the performance of the model but comes at the cost of countercyclical vacancy dynamics. Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) advocate calibrating the model to include a high opportunity cost of employment and a low
employee bargaining weight. This paper serves as a complement to the literature by offering an alternative
explanation for the unemployment volatility puzzle.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 presents
the calibration strategy and the quantitative results of the model. Section 4 explores the robustness of the
results under different interest rate and monopolist competition specifications. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
2.1. Labor Market
There is a unit mass of workers in the economy. At the beginning of each period, ρ0 fraction of the
employed workers from the previous period are separated from their jobs. Let nt−1 be the number of
workers who were employed in the economy in period t − 1. The total number of job seekers in period t is
then:
ut = 1− (1− ρ0)nt−1.
Let vt be the aggregate number of vacancies posted by firms in the economy and mt the number of
matches formed. I follow the literature in assuming a Cobb-Douglas matching function:
mt = m0u
µ
t v
1−µ
t ,
where m0 is the scale parameter and µ ∈ (0, 1) is the match elasticity with respect to job seekers.
With all the ingredients in place, the law of motion for aggregate employment can be written as:
nt = (1− ρ0)nt−1 +mt.
Note that given the quarterly timing, I allow a worker who is exogenously separated at the beginning of a
period to—(1) join the pool of job seekers; (2) form a match with an employer; and (3) produce output—all
within the same quarter. This implies the relevant unemployment statistics of the model that is comparable
to data is
umt = 1− nt,
where umt denotes measured unemployment. Measured unemployment corresponds to the number of workers
who are not producing output at time t.
Lastly, the job finding rate for a job seeker can be defined as:
ft =
mt
ut
;
and likewise the vacancy fill rate:
qt =
mt
vt
.
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2.2. Final Good Firm
There is a perfectly competitive final good producer that produces composite good yt by combining a
continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i ∈ (0, 1) using the technology:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yi,t
εp−1
εp di
) εp
εp−1
, (1)
where εp > 1. Let pi,t be the price for intermediate good i and Pt be the price of the composite good. Profit
maximization by the final good firm implies the demand for variety i is:
yi,t =
(
Pt
pi,t
)εp
yt. (2)
Applying equation (1) and integrating over equation (2) give us the composite good price index:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
pi,t
1−εpdi
) 1
1−εp
.
2.3. Intermediate Good Firms
Each differentiated intermediate good is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm using labor as
the only input. The production technology is:
yi,t = Atni,t,
where At is the aggregate labor productivity which follows an autoregressive process:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + σAςAt ;
ςAt is assumed to be i.i.d. N (0, 1); σA is the standard deviation of the innovations.
Firms acquire labor input by posting vacancies. For firm i that begins period t with ni,t−1 units of labor
and posts vi,t vacancies, its employment law of motion is
ni,t = (1− ρ0)ni,t−1 + qtvi,t,
where firms take the economy-wide vacancy fill rate qt as given. The cost of vacancy creation is κvvi,t.
Given that the representative household owns the firms, intermediate good firms discount future profits
using household’s stochastic discount factor. Firm i chooses vi,t and price pi,t to maximize its present dis-
counted profits subject to its employment law of motion and the demand for good i. I assume firms and their
workers jointly determine the wage through a bargaining process that will be described in detail shortly. I
require the firms to finance γ ∈ [0, 1] fraction of their real wage payment wi,tni,t through the financial interme-
diary at gross interest rate Rt; this implies the relevant per-worker wage cost for firm i is (1− γ + γRt)wi,t.
Firms can adjust prices by incurring a real price adjustment cost of
κp
2
(
pi,t+s
pi,t−1+s
− pi
)2
yt+s. Firm i’s problem
can be written as:
max
{vi,t+s,pi,t+s}∞s=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
λt+s
λt
{(
pi,t+s
Pt+s
)
yi,t+s − (1− γ + γRt+s)wi,t+sni,t+s
− κvvi,t+s − κp
2
(
pi,t+s
pi,t−1+s
− pi
)2
yt+s
}
,
subject to
ni,t = (1− ρ0)ni,t−1 + qtvi,t,
4
and
yi,t =
(
Pt
pi,t
)εp
yt.
The first order conditions are:
vi,t :
κv
qt
= Jt, (3)
pi,t : 1− κp (pit − pi)pit + βEtλt+1
λt
κp (pit+1 − pi)pit+1 yt+1
yt
= εp(1− φt), (4)
where pit ≡ PtPt−1 . All firms are identical so I apply symmetry and drop firm subscripts. Jt is the Lagrange
multiplier for employment law of motion and (1 − φt) is the Lagrange multiplier for demand. Jt can be
interpreted as the value of the marginal worker to a firm and can be derived by taking the derivative of
firm’s objective function with respect to nt subject to the two constraints. It is:
Jt = φtAt − (1− γ + γRt)wt + (1− ρ0)βEtλt+1
λt
Jt+1. (5)
This expression tells us the value of the marginal worker to a firm is her marginal revenue product less
the wage payment plus the continuation value. Similarly, 1 − φt is the incremental profit from selling one
additional unit of intermediate good; this leaves us with φt being the real marginal cost of production. We
will examine φt more closely in section 2.9.
2.4. Financial Intermediary
There is a perfectly competitive financial intermediary that receives nominal deposits Dt from the house-
hold and a nominal lump-sum transfer Xt from the monetary authority. These funds are supplied to the
loan market at gross interest rate Rt. The demand for loans comes from firms that seek to finance their
wage payments γwtnt. The loan market clearing condition is:
Ptγwtnt = Dt +Xt.
At the end of period t, the financial intermediary returns RtDt to the household for the use of its deposits;
the household also receives RtXt as profits.
2.5. Household
The economy consists of a representative household with a continuum of identical members. I abstract
from labor force participation choice—every member of the household is either employed or is actively
searching for work. Those who are employed receive wage income wt; those who are unemployed receive
unemployment insurance b from the government. Each household member’s utility is additively separa-
ble in consumption, and there is perfect risk-sharing among members of the household, yielding the same
consumption for everyone in the household.
Let ct be the household’s consumption of the composite good. The household’s objective function can
be written as:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
c1−σt+s − 1
1− σ
)
, (6)
where β is the discount factor; and σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In addition to choosing consumption, the household can deposit Dt in the financial intermediary earning
gross interest Rt, which can then be used to finance next period’s consumption. Conditional on nt, the
number of employed household members, the household maximizes its objective function (6) subject to a
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sequence of budget constraints:
ct+s +
Dt+s
Pt+s
≤ wt+snt+s +Rt−1+s (Dt−1+s +Xt−1+s)
Pt+s
+ (1− nt+s)b+ Πt+s + Tt+s,
where Πt is the lump-sum dividend profit from the firms; and Tt is the sum of a lump-sum transfer from the
government and the monetary authority.
The household’s first order conditions are:
ct : c
−σ
t = λt
Dt : λt = βRtEtλt+1
Pt
Pt+1
For the purpose of wage setting that will be discussed shortly, it is useful to write down the value of
an employed worker to the household. Let Ut and Wt denote the value of an unemployed worker and an
employed worker respectively. The value of an unemployed worker is:
Ut = b+ βEt
λt+1
λt
[ft+1Wt+1 + (1− ft+1)Ut+1] ; (7)
and the value of an employed worker is:
Wt = wt + βEt
λt+1
λt
[(1− ρ0 + ρ0ft+1)Wt+1 + ρ0(1− ft+1)Ut+1] . (8)
Equation (7) says that the value of an unemployed worker is the unemployment insurance she receives plus
the continuation value weighted by the probability of finding a job in the next period. Equation (8) says
that the value of an employed worker is the wage payment she receives plus the continuation value weighted
by the probability that she continues to have a job in the next period. The surplus of an employed worker,
Mt = Wt − Ut, is then:
Mt = wt − b+ βEtλt+1
λt
(1− ρ0)(1− ft+1)Mt+1. (9)
2.6. Wage Setting
Labor market friction creates a positive surplus to be shared between the employers and their employees.
In this model, the firms and their workers jointly determine wage wt. As in Shimer (2005), Nash bargaining
is used—wage is set to solve the following problem:
max
wt
Mηt J
1−η
t ,
where η ∈ [0, 1]. The first order condition is:
(1− γ + γRt)(1− η)Mt = ηJt. (10)
Substituting equations (5) and (9) into condition (10) yields the wage:
(1− γ + γRt)wt = ηφtAt + (1− γ + γRt)(1− η)b+ η(1− ρ0)βEtλt+1
λt
κv
qt+1
− η(1− γ + γRt)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− ρ0)(1− ft+1)
1− γ + γRt+1
κv
qt+1
.
It is easy to see that if firms are not required to finance any portion of their wages (γ = 0) and when
intermediate goods become more and more like perfect substitutes (φt → 1), the wage becomes the standard
textbook search model wage.
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2.7. Government and Monetary Authority
Let variables without a time subscript denote their non-stochastic steady-state values. I set the unem-
ployment insurance to be a constant fraction of the steady-state marginal product of labor b = b¯A. The
government imposes a lump-sum transfer Tt to finance the unemployment insurance and a monetary injection
Xt that is required to clear the loan market.
I further assume the monetary authority follows the interest rate rule:(
Rt
R
)
=
(
Rt−1
R
)ρR [(pit
pi
)ρpi (yt
y
)ρy]1−ρR
eσ
RςRt , (11)
where ςRt is i.i.d. N (0, 1) and σR is the standard deviation of the innovations.
2.8. Resource Constraint
Lastly, I close the model with the resource constraint:
yt = ct.
2.9. Working Capital Requirement and Job Creation
Let’s take a moment and examine how the working capital requirement along with monopolistic compe-
tition is expected to allow the model to generate more employment volatility. We start with the expression
for marginal cost φt. Rearrange equation (5), we get:
φt =
(1− γ + γRt)wt
At
+
Jt − (1− ρ0)βEt λt+1λt Jt+1
At
.
A positive labor productivity shock drives down marginal cost φt. Next, the price setting condition (4) yields
the log-linearized form:
pˆit =
εp − 1
κp
φˆt + βEtpˆit+1, (12)
where the “hat” variables are log-deviation from their non-stochastic steady-state values. Equation (12)
indicates that lower real marginal cost in turn lowers inflation.
Given the monetary authority follows the interest rate rule (11), the monetary authority would lower the
nominal interest rate Rt in response to a decrease in inflation. Moreover, the persistence term in the interest
rate rule would keep the nominal interest rate low for several quarters.
For convenience, the Nash rent sharing wage for this model is rewritten here:
(1− γ + γRt)wt = ηφtAt + (1− γ + γRt)(1− η)b+ η(1− ρ0)βEtλt+1
λt
κv
qt+1
− η(1− γ + γRt)βEtλt+1
λt
(1− ρ0)(1− st+1)
1− γ + γRt+1
κv
qt+1
.
In the presence of a working capital requirement, (1 − γ + γRt)wt is the relevant per-worker labor cost to
the firms. The nominal interest rate enters and affects the labor cost equation in three ways:
(i) Lower Rt lowers the contribution of unemployment insurance to the labor cost;
(ii) Lower Rt raises the contribution of worker’s continuation value to the labor cost; and
(iii) Lower EtRt+1 lowers the worker’s continuation value which lowers the labor cost.
Given that we expect both the contemporaneous nominal interest rate and the expected future rate to fall,
effects (i) and (iii) would moderate the increase in labor cost whereas effect (ii) would increase the labor cost.
While the net effect is not immediately clear, the typical calibration strategy of—(1) setting unemployment
insurance b to be at least 40 percent of labor productivity; and (2) requiring vacancy creation cost κv to
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be a small percentage of output—suggests effect (i) would be the dominant effect and a fall in the nominal
interest rate would moderate the increase in labor cost. Lastly, a smaller increase in wage cost implies firms
retain a greater portion of a rise in labor productivity as profits which would in turn encourage firms to
create more vacancies. The interaction of these effects is how the working capital requirement is expected
to allow the model to generate more employment volatility.
3. Calibration and Simulation Results
This section details the calibration strategy as well as the approach this paper takes to examine the
quantitative properties of the model.
3.1. Calibration
I begin with the labor market parameters. I set u¯, the non-stochastic steady-state pool of job seekers to
0.1525—this yields 5.83 percent measured unemployment rate which is the average U.S. unemployment rate
between 1951Q1 and 2012Q1. I calibrate the non-stochastic steady-state firm’s vacancy fill rate q¯ to 0.7, the
same value used by den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), Cooley and Quadrini (1999), and Krause and
Lubik (2007). The exogenous quarterly separation rate ρ0 is set to 0.1. This is consistent with 0.034 monthly
separation rate computed by Shimer (2005) and is within the range of values used in the literature, ranging
from 0.07 in Merz (1995) to 0.15 in Andolfatto (1996). I set both the elasticity of matches to unemployment
µ and the worker’s bargaining power η to 0.5; they are both within the range of value in the literature.3
I choose the “replacement ratio” b¯ to be 0.73 as is advocated in Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007a); it is 0.4
in Shimer (2005) and 0.955 in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). Note that my choice of µ and b¯ allows the
model to generate greater volatility in employment variables relative to Shimer (2005). I will show that this
alone is not sufficient to match the observed volatilities.
Next up is the set of parameters that are common in the macroeconomics literature. The discount rate β
is set to 0.99; combined with steady-state inflation pi of 1, the steady-state quarterly nominal interest rate is
1.01 percent. The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is 2. The elasticity parameter in the consumption good
aggregation technology εp is set to 11; this implies a steady-state markup of 10 percent, which is standard in
the literature.4 As for κp, the price adjustment cost parameter, note the slope of the log-linearized Phillips
curve is
εp−1
κp
. The empirical estimates of the slope varies widely—from 0.03 in Gal´ı and Gertler (1999)
to 1.25 in Ireland (1997). Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) considers a New Keynesian model similar to the
one presented in this paper, and they find the value of the slope coefficient around 0.5. Given εp = 11,
this implies κp = 20.
5 Neither εp or κp are common features of search-and-matching models; I will explore
different specifications in Section 4.
I calibrate the interest rate rule using the mean estimates from Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) since their
specification of the interest rate rule most closely resembles what is modeled in this paper. The persistence
parameter ρR is set to 0.8. The inflation and output coefficients ρpi and ρy are 2.0 and 0.3, respectively.
6 I
will explore different parameter values for robustness checks. Given that this paper focuses on the volatility
3The values of µ range from 0.4 in Merz (1995) to 0.72 in Shimer (2005). η, worker share of match surplus, is less well-
established in the literature; while my model is not directly comparable to that of Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), it is worth
noting that they estimate a medium-sized monetary DSGE model and find η to be 0.907 under staggered wage contracting and
0.616 under flexible wage, highlighting a wide range of plausible values for η.
4See, for instance, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Cogley et al.
(2010).
5Furthermore, note that the Phillips curve slope coefficient is observationally equivalent to the one under Calvo-pricing.
More specifically, a slope of 0.5 implies a median duration of prices of 6 months, which is in line with findings from Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) who find the median duration of 4.5 months of all goods and services and 11 months excluding sales. Bils
and Klenow (2004) have a similar finding of 4.3 months for all goods and services and find a shorter median duration of 5.5
months excluding sales items.
6These values are within the range of what is typically found in the literature. For example, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)
specify a similar interest rate rule and find the interest rate persistence, inflation response, and output response coefficients to
be 0.81, 1.92, and 0.10, respectively. Cogley et al. (2010) measures inflation gap using a time-varying inflation target and find
the interest rate persistence to be 0.63; the inflation and output coefficients to be 1.78 and 0.66 respectively. Clarida et al.
(2000) use expected inflation and output gap in their interest rate rule and find the interest rate persistence parameter, inflation
response, and output response to be 0.79, 2.15, and 0.93, respectively.
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Parameter Value Description
u¯ 0.1525 5.83 percent measured unemployment, U.S average
q¯ 0.7 Non-stochastic steady-state vacancy fill rate
ρ0 0.10 0.035 monthly separation rate
µ 0.5 Elasticity of matches to unemployment
η 0.5 Worker share of match surplus
b¯ 0.73 Replacement ratio
β 0.99 Discount rate
pi 1 Non-stochastic steady-state inflation
σ 2 Constant relative risk aversion
εp 11 Non-stochastic steady-state markup of 10 percent
κp 20 Price adjustment cost
ρR 0.8 Interest rate rule inertia
ρpi 2.0 Interest rate rule inflation
ρy 0.3 Interest rate rule output
ρa 0.8976 Productivity process persistence
σA 0.00934 Standard deviation of productivity innovations
Table 1: Calibrated parameters. See Section 3.1 for details.
of vacancy and unemployment following a labor productivity shock, I turn off the interest rule innovations
in simulations by setting σR to 0.
The last set of parameters governs the labor productivity process. ρa is set to 0.8976 to match the
quarterly autocorrelation of non-farm business sector output per person between 1951Q1 and 2012Q1. σA
is chosen such that the simulated labor productivity volatility matches that of the data; it is calibrated to
0.00934.
The calibrated parameters are summarized in table 1.
3.2. Impulse Response Functions
The model is solved using first-order perturbation methods. Figure 1 examines the effects of a one
percent increase in labor productivity; this is an increase of At from 1 to 1.01. The magenta line (with
×s) represents the textbook search model—the version of the model without monopolistic competition and
without a working capital requirement. The blue solid line is from the version of the model with monopolistic
competition and no working capital requirement (γ = 0). The red line (with filled circles) represent the
version of the model with both monopolistic competition and a full working capital requirement (γ = 1).
We begin with the marginal cost panel. Higher labor productivity lowers marginal cost which in turn
lowers inflation. Due to a drop in inflation, the monetary authority lowers the nominal interest rate according
to the interest rate rule.7 Two observations can be made with regard to the labor cost. One, the rise in the
labor cost for monopolistic competition is less than the labor cost increase for the textbook search model.
This is because the firms now face a downward-sloping demand curve. Therefore the drop in marginal revenue
(which equals marginal cost) neutralizes the increase in labor productivity; this in fact results in a slightly
negative marginal revenue product growth (φˆt + Aˆt) in the quarter the shock arrives. Unlike the textbook
model where the rise in wage is due directly to a contemporaneous increase in labor productivity, the initial
increase in wage for the monopolistic competition model is due to the rise in the continuation value of a
filled position. The second observation is that the working capital requirement does indeed moderate wage
increases when we compare the labor cost responses for γ = 0 and γ = 1.
Moving on to the worker value panel. We see that even though the labor cost rises much less for γ = 0
relative to the textbook model, it does not translate into a significantly different worker value. Again, this is
because the fallen marginal revenue offsets the increase in labor productivity, resulting in similar surpluses.
Next, comparing the IRFs of γ = 0 and γ = 1 allows us to see that even a modest amount of difference in
the labor cost translates into a noticeable difference in worker value. This is in part due to the fact that
wages are typically several times larger than the surplus value of a worker to a firm in search models; so a
7φt, pit, and Rt are represented as flat lines under the textbook model because they are not part of the model.
9
0
5
10
15
20
0
0.
51
1.
5
ou
tp
ut
, y
0
5
10
15
20
0123456
va
ca
nc
y,
 v
0
5
10
15
20
-3
-2
.5-2
-1
.5-1
-0
.50
jo
b 
se
ek
er
s,
 u
0
5
10
15
20
-0
.8
-0
.6
-0
.4
-0
.20
no
m
in
al
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
, R
 
 
te
xt
bo
ok
=0 =1
0
5
10
15
20
-1
.5-1
-0
.500.
5
in
fla
tio
n,
 
0
5
10
15
20
-1
.5-1
-0
.50
m
ar
gi
na
l c
os
t, 

0
5
10
15
20
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
la
bo
r c
os
t, 
(1
-+
R
)w
0
5
10
15
20
01234
w
or
ke
r v
al
ue
, J
0
5
10
15
20
02468
m
ar
ke
t t
ig
ht
ne
ss
, 
F
ig
u
re
1
:
Im
p
u
ls
e
re
sp
o
n
se
fu
n
ct
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
te
x
tb
o
o
k
(b
en
ch
m
a
rk
),
γ
=
0
,
a
n
d
γ
=
1
.
10
u v v/u A
Standard deviation 0.192 0.190 0.370 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.943 0.944 0.945 0.898
OLS regression coefficient −4.011 3.383 7.394 –
Correlation matrix
u 1 −0.876 −0.969 −0.425
v – 1 0.968 0.362
v/u – – 1 0.407
A – – – 1
Table 2: Summary statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951–2012Q1. This table is a replication of table 1 in Shimer (2005)
with the time horizon extended to 2012Q1. The OLS regression coefficients are ρx,A
σx
σA
for variable x.
small change in wage can have a large impact on worker value. Moreover, employer-employee relationships
last an extended period of time, and small differences add up over the lifetime of a relationship.
Lastly, we examine market tightness. The log-linearized version of the job creation condition (3) is:
µθˆt = Jˆt.
With what we have just seen in the IRFs for worker value Jt, it should be no surprise that γ = 1 version
of the model generates the largest response in market tightness while γ = 0 performs comparably to the
textbook model.
The IRFs confirm the intuition of the model: a working capital requirement can help the search-and-
matching models generate more fluctuations in employment variables. In the following section I present the
numerical simulation results.8
3.3. Simulation Results
I have reproduced table 1 in Shimer (2005) using U.S. data from 1951Q1 to 2012Q1. Unemployment
is the quarterly average of monthly seasonally adjusted level of unemployment from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). From January 1951 to November 2000, vacancy is from the Conference Board’s help-wanted
index; from December 2000 onward, vacancy is BLS’s total non-farm job openings.9 The quarterly vacancy
figures are averaged over monthly numbers. Labor productivity is BLS’s output per person in the non-farm
business sector. All data is logged and detrended using Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter
of 105. One set of statistics that is not in the original Shimer table is the OLS regression coefficients.
Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007a) point out that since labor productivity is one of the many driving forces in
the real world, one cannot expect labor productivity shocks to explain all the fluctuations in labor market
variables. Therefore, the elasticity of market tightness with respect to labor productivity should be the
OLS regression coefficient where market tightness is the dependent variable and labor productivity is the
independent variable. It can be computed as ρθ,A
(
σθ
σA
)
, where ρθ,A is the correlation coefficient between
market tightness and labor productivity and σθ and σA are the standard deviations. The summary statistics
are reproduced in table 2 below. For comparison purpose, table 3 is a reproduction of table 1 in Shimer
(2005). The statistics between two different sample periods are comparable. I will use the statistics of the
more comprehensive sample as the yardstick.
Each round of simulation is done by drawing 1,245 i.i.d. N (0, σA) labor productivity shocks; simulating
the economy with those shocks; discarding the first 1,000 periods; and computing the relevant statistics for
the remaining 245 periods corresponding to the number of quarters from 1951Q1 to 2012Q1. The statistics
reported in table 4 are their means across 10,000 simulations. The figures in parentheses are the standard
deviations of the statistics.
8It is worth noting that, as pointed out by Fujita and Ramey (2007), the textbook search model does not have a propagation
mechanism. Based on what we have observed here, the interaction between marginal revenue and labor productivity yields
hump-shaped responses in output, vacancy, and market tightness; it provides a level of propagation that is not seen in the
textbook model.
9As is commonly done in the literature, I combine the two vacancy series by finding the ratio of job openings to help-wanted
index in December 2000 and applying the ratio to all job openings figures to convert them to help-wanted index-like numbers.
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u v v/u A
Standard deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.878
OLS regression coefficient −3.876 3.676 7.564 –
Correlation matrix
u 1 −0.894 −0.971 −0.408
v – 1 0.975 0.364
v/u – – 1 0.396
A – – – 1
Table 3: Summary statistics, quarterly U.S. data, 1951–2003. This table is a reproduction of table 1 in Shimer (2005).
The OLS regression coefficients are not in the original table. The coefficient is ρx,A
σx
σA
for variable x.
There are three columns under each variable. The first column is from the textbook search model (no
monopolistic competition and no working capital requirement); the second column contains statistics for the
γ = 0 model (monopolistic competition and no working capital requirement); and the third column is for
γ = 1 model which has a full complement of features (monopolistic competition and full working capital
requirement).
Since the textbook model in this paper is slightly different from that of Shimer (2005), I will first go
over the textbook model results to establish the benchmark upon which the model needs to improve.10 As
Mortensen and Nagypa´l (2007a) point out, with labor productivity as the sole driving force of the model, one
should not expect the employment fluctuations to match the data, so I will compare the relative standard
deviations in the simulations to the data OLS regression coefficients as opposed to data relative standard
deviations.
First, with the elasticity of matches to market tightness at 0.5 and the opportunity cost of employment at
0.73, the model is more volatile relative to Shimer (2005). However, unemployment volatility is still less than
half of the data (1.833/4.011 = 0.457). The model vacancy’s volatility does improve to nearly 90 percent
of the OLS coefficient (3.033/3.383 = 0.897). Largely because of the vacancy volatility, market tightness
volatility performs better at 4.513 or 61 percent of the OLS coefficient rather than the 1.750 or 24 percent
in Shimer (2005). However, the model still cannot reproduce observed patterns.
Aside from the volatility of unemployment and market tightness, there appear to be shortcomings in the
Beveridge curve (the strong negative correlation between unemployment and vacancy) and low autocorrela-
tion in vacancy. The model shows a correlation coefficient of −0.703 between unemployment and vacancy
where it is −0.894 in the data. This difference is due to the quarterly discrete time setup—the pool of job
seekers in period t ut depends only on period t− 1’s employment pool so it lags vacancy vt by one quarter.
If we look at 1− nt which is the number of people without a job in period t, the correlation coefficient with
vt is −0.899 which is in line with the observed Beveridge curve. In terms of autocorrelation of vacancy, the
model autocorrelation is 0.739 while it is 0.944 in the data. This difference is because the textbook search
model lacks a propagation mechanism so vacancy jumps the moment a shock arrives and then adjusts back
to its steady-state value. Therefore, vacancy would jump back and forth in response to positive and negative
productivity shocks which reduce its autocorrelation.
Next we move on to the γ = 0 version of the model which incorporates monopolistic competition but
no working capital requirement. The volatilities of the labor market variables are comparable to that of
the textbook model. Unemployment volatility shows a 4 percent increase; vacancy volatility decreases by
less than 1 percent; market tightness volatility increases by 3 percent. These results are not surprising from
what we have seen in the impulse response functions. Note the interaction of marginal revenue φt and labor
productivity At generates a hump-shaped response to marginal revenue product of labor which in turn gen-
erates hump-shaped responses to vacancy, unemployment, and market tightness. The interaction of marginal
revenue and labor productivity therefore increases the autocorrelations of these variables. The interaction
also improves the Beveridge curve and the correlation between market tightness and unemployment.
Lastly we examine the γ = 1 version of the model. Notice that when firms are required to finance
10The key differences are the choice of labor market parameters—the “replacement ratio,” workers’ bargaining power, and
the elasticity of market tightness with respect to new matches—as well as the quarterly discrete time setup.
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their wage bills and incorporate the nominal interest rate as a component of the labor cost, volatilities of
employment variables increase significantly. Unemployment volatility now reaches 81 percent of the OLS
coefficient, up from 46 percent. The relative standard deviation of vacancy overshoots at 147 percent of
the OLS coefficient; and market tightness becomes slightly more volatile than the data at 106 percent, up
from 61 percent achieved by the textbook model. Overall, requiring firms to finance their wage bills in full
increases vacancy volatility by 63 percent over the textbook search model and 65 percent over the γ = 0
version of the model; unemployment volatility shows a 78 percent increase over the textbook model and 70
percent over γ = 0; market tightness volatility goes up by 74 percent and 69 percent relative to the textbook
and γ = 0 versions of the model, respectively. It also produces stronger autocorrelations and correlations
among labor market variables; these statistics are in line with their empirical counterparts.
Data Textbook γ = 0 γ = 1
Labor cost-productivity
elasticity
0.606
0.954 0.719 0.632 1.294
(0.001) (0.011) (0.010) (0.024)
Table 5: Data and simulated model labor cost statistics. The data labor cost is constructed following Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) by taking the product of labor share and labor productivity. The data labor cost series is
then logged and HP detrended using 105 as the smoothing parameter. The data labor cost-productivity elasticity
is the OLS coefficient from regressing log labor cost on log productivity. The elasticity from the simulated model
is the relative standard deviation—the standard deviation of labor cost divided by the standard deviation of labor
productivity. The first column under the full working capital requirement is the labor cost (1− γ + γRt)wt, and the
second column is the wage component of the labor cost wt.
Table 5 examines the cyclical properties of labor cost. I follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and
construct the labor cost by multiplying the BLS labor share and labor productivity. The data is then logged
and detrended with an HP filter using 105 as the smoothing parameter. I find that OLS coefficient from
regressing log labor cost on log labor productivity is 0.606 in the data. Unsurprisingly, the relative standard
deviation for the textbook model is nearly 1 at 0.954, echoing the findings of many other researchers.
Due to the interaction of marginal revenue and labor productivity, the incorporation of monopolistic
competition into the textbook model reduces labor cost elasticity to 0.719. Furthermore, with both monop-
olistic competition and a full working capital requirement, the elasticity of labor cost drops to 0.632, which
is comparable to the data.
Next we examine the cyclical properties of the wage component of labor cost. As Pissarides (2009) argues,
the dynamics of job creation in a search and matching model like the one examined here is driven by the
share of firm’s surplus in a new match. Therefore, when considering the cyclicality of wages in the context
of a search and matching model, the relevant comparison is the results of panel studies of job changers
rather than aggregate studies. Haefke et al. (2013) and Kudlyak (2014) have made the similar point in
more recent studies. More importantly, these studies establish that the individual wages, especially those
in newly-formed matches, are more procyclical than average wage. Pissarides (2009) surveys the literature
and finds the consensus wage-productivity elasticity between 1948–2006 to be 1.02. Using Panel Study of
Income Dynamics data, Pissarides (2009) finds elasticity to be 1.70.
It is interesting to note that while a working capital requirement generates a more rigid labor cost than the
textbook search and matching model, the model does not require rigid wages to address the unemployment
volatility puzzle. In fact, under a full working capital requirement, the relative standard deviation of the
wage component in labor cost to labor productivity is 1.294, which is in line with the findings in Pissarides
(2009).
4. Robustness
Given that the interest rate rule and monopolistic competition are not standard features of the search
model, I explore alternative calibrations in this section and examine their effects on the quantitative results
of the model.
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4.1. Interest Rate Rule
There are three parameters—ρR, ρpi, and ρy—in the interest rate rule. As a quick refresher, ρR is the
interest rate persistence parameter, ρpi and ρy are the weights the monetary authority assigns to the inflation
target and the steady-state output, respectively. I will examine the parameters one by one.
Intuitively, the smaller the ρR, the less weight the monetary authority places on previous period’s interest
rate and the more weight on keeping inflation and output close to their steady-state values. The role ρR
plays is shown in figure 2. As we can see, smaller ρR serves to prevent inflation from falling too much.
Working through the Phillips curve, equation (12), marginal revenue also stays closer to its steady-state
value. Combining this with lower Rt, worker value is kept high when ρR is smaller.
11 The mean relative
standard deviation of market tightness (the standard deviation across simulations is in parentheses) for
ρR = 0.7 is 8.648 (0.139); it is 6.842 (0.081) for ρR = 0.9.
Figure 3 examines ρpi, the weight on inflation. The greater the ρpi, the more the monetary authority
would like to keep inflation close to its steady-state value; this leads to smaller initial drop in inflation
and marginal revenue. However, the discrepancy in marginal revenue product is largely offset by the labor
cost—after the initial shock, there is little difference in worker value and market tightness under different
values of ρpi. The relative standard deviations for ρpi = 1.5 and ρpi = 3 are 8.254 (0.106) and 7.796 (0.120),
respectively.
Figure 4 examines ρy. Relatively speaking, a smaller ρy indicates that the monetary authority places a
greater emphasis on keeping interest rate and inflation close to their steady-state values. It keeps inflation
and marginal revenue from falling too much immediately following the shock and keeps worker value high.
However, marginal revenue recovers quickly even with a high ρy. While the specification with a higher ρy
has a similar marginal revenue as the specification with a lower ρy by the second quarter after the shock, it
also has a relatively low nominal interest rate, and interest rate inertia keeps Rt low, which leads to lower
labor cost. This allows the worker value for higher ρy to overtake the worker value of lower ρy in quarter
2, resulting in a slightly greater response to market tightness. The mean standard deviation and standard
deviation of the statistics across simulations are: ρy = 0.1—7.430 (0.135); and ρy = 0.5—8.443 (0.152).
It should be noted that the main quantitative result—the working capital requirement allows search-and-
matching model to generate substantially more volatility—holds for a wide range of parameter values in the
interest rate rule. Table 6 summarizes the simulations. Next I will examine the parameters in the Phillips
curve.
4.2. Phillips Curve
There are two parameters in the Phillips curve—κp price adjustment cost and εp the degree of substi-
tutability among intermediate goods.
Figure 5 plots the IRFs for different values of κp. Intuitively, the smaller the κp, the greater degree of
price flexibility. This means prices would change more to avoid large swings in marginal revenues. This
keeps worker value high and allows firms to create more vacancies than when it is more costly to adjust
prices. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) use a log-likelihood approach to estimate a New Keynesian Phillips
curve similar to the one presented in this paper. They find the 90-percent interval of the slope coefficient
εp−1
κp
to be [0.27, 0.89]. Assuming a 10-percent steady-state markup as is typically done in the literature,
it implies κp ∈ [11.24, 37.04]. Here I provide a robustness check for κp = 10 and κp = 40. The statistics
for relative standard deviation of market tightness are: for κp = 10—8.682 (0.134); and for κp = 40—6.762
(0.129).
In terms of εp, the degree of substitutability among intermediate goods, the smaller the εp, the larger
the steady-state markup; the larger the markup, the greater portion of sales proceeds is retained as profits
and the greater the incentive to create vacancies. This effect is what we observe in figure 6. Estimates
of the steady-state markup in the literature vary depending on the types of frictions considered and the
specification of the model.12 In this section I consider εp = 6.67 and 20, which correspond to a 15 percent
11In the case of ρR = 0.9, inflation is allowed to fall to the extent that the marginal revenue product falls significantly and
temporarily reduces worker value despite a positive productivity shock.
12For example, Christiano et al. (2005) find the steady-state markup ranges from 6 percent to 20 percent; Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997) finds the steady-state markup to be approximately 13 percent.
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Data ρR = 0.7 ρR = 0.9 ρpi = 1.5 ρpi = 3 ρy = 0.1 ρy = 0.5
Relative standard
deviation
u 4.011
3.573 2.788 3.377 3.215 3.074 3.491
(0.089) (0.067) (0.082) (0.079) (0.081) (0.093)
v 3.383
5.504 4.551 5.422 4.990 4.700 5.357
(0.051) (0.115) (0.112) (0.054) (0.030) (0.041)
v/u 7.394
8.648 6.842 8.254 7.796 7.430 8.443
(0.139) (0.081) (0.106) (0.120) (0.135) (0.152)
Autocorrelation
u 0.943
0.967 0.949 0.954 0.965 0.969 0.968
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
v 0.944
0.889 0.739 0.779 0.866 0.902 0.894
(0.028) (0.060) (0.052) (0.034) (0.025) (0.027)
v/u 0.945
0.949 0.897 0.912 0.942 0.954 0.952
(0.015) (0.030) (0.025) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
Correlation
coefficient
u, v −0.876 −0.807 −0.722 −0.746 −0.796 −0.818 −0.813
(0.048) (0.064) (0.06) (0.05) (0.046) (0.047)
u, v/u −0.969 −0.926 −0.887 −0.898 −0.921 −0.931 −0.929
(0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
v, v/u 0.968
0.970 0.960 0.963 0.969 0.972 0.971
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Table 6: Robustness checks for interest rate rule parameters. Each reported statistic is the mean from 10,000 simula-
tions. The standard deviation across simulations are reported in parentheses.
and a 5 percent steady-state markup, respectively. Note that the Phillips curve coefficient is
εp−1
κp
. When εp
is small, the ratio of log-deviation in inflation to log-deviation in marginal cost is small. This is especially
prevalent in the quarter the shock hits the economy. The magnitudes of the falls in marginal revenue and
inflation are about 1-to-1 for the 15 percent markup case, whereas marginal costs fall by much less in the
other two cases for similar changes in inflation. Note this initial fall in marginal cost contributes to a lower
marginal revenue product and lower worker value in quarter 1 for the 15 percent markup specification.
However, once marginal revenue recovers, worker value picks back up due to lower labor cost. 15 percent
markup calibration generates a relative standard deviation of 10.609 (0.269); 5 percent markup generates
7.048 (0.105).
Similar to our examination of the interest rate rule, the main result of the paper continues to hold for a
wide range of Phillips curve parameters. Table 7 summarizes the simulations.
4.3. Partial Working Capital Requirement
Section 3.3 focuses on zero working capital requirement (γ = 0) and a full working capital requirement
(γ = 1). Table 8 presents simulation results under various partial working capital requirements.
From what we have seen between γ = 0 and γ = 1, it should not be surprising to find that the model
generates greater amounts of labor market variable volatility the higher the γ. It is worth noting that the
model with a full working working capital requirement produces a vacancy response that is higher than what
is observed in the data. A partial working capital requirement—γ between 0 and 1—reduces this volatility,
but it reduces unemployment volatility at the same time. However, the propagation mechanism generated
by monopolistic competition is preserved regardless of the value of γ and allows the model to show desirable
autocorrelations and correlation coefficients among key labor market variables.
5. Conclusion
Shimer (2005) argues that search-and-matching models that utilize Nash bargaining cannot match the
observed volatility in key labor market variables with plausible labor productivity shocks. This paper
examines how a working capital requirement along with monopolistic competition can increase employment
fluctuations without resorting to an alternative wage setting mechanism. I find that, relative to the textbook
search-and-matching model, the model with monopolistic competition and a working capital requirement
delivers a 78 percent increase in unemployment volatility, a 63 percent increase in vacancy volatility, and
a 74 percent increase in market tightness volatility. The unemployment volatility now reaches 81 percent
of the OLS regression coefficient. The relative standard deviation of vacancy overshoots the target at 147
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Data κp = 10 κp = 40 εp = 6.67 εp = 20
Relative standard
deviation
u 4.011
3.586 2.790 4.410 2.911
(0.087) (0.080) (0.144) (0.069)
v 3.383
5.527 4.321 6.607 4.488
(0.055) (0.038) (0.039) (0.048)
v/u 7.394
8.682 6.762 10.609 7.048
(0.134) (0.129) (0.269) (0.105)
Autocorrelation
u 0.943
0.967 0.965 0.975 0.967
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
v 0.944
0.892 0.857 0.931 0.895
(0.027) (0.037) (0.019) (0.026)
v/u 0.945
0.950 0.941 0.966 0.951
(0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.014)
Correlation
coefficient
u, v −0.876 −0.806 −0.799 −0.848 −0.806
(0.048) (0.050) (0.040) (0.048)
u, v/u −0.969 −0.926 −0.922 −0.944 −0.926
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021)
v, v/u 0.968
0.970 0.969 0.976 0.970
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Table 7: Robustness checks for monopolistic competition parameters. εp = 6.67 corresponds to 15 percent steady-state
markup; εp = 20 corresponds to 5 percent steady-state markup. Each reported statistic is the mean from 10,000
simulations. The standard deviation across simulations are reported in parentheses.
Data γ = 0 γ = 0.25 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.75 γ = 1
Relative standard
deviation
u 4.011
1.915 2.201 2.518 2.870 3.263
(0.046) (0.055) (0.065) (0.076) (0.089)
v 3.383
3.005 3.407 3.863 4.378 4.958
(0.045) (0.037) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027)
v/u 7.394
4.655 5.334 6.090 6.932 7.874
(0.063) (0.083) (0.104) (0.126) (0.151)
Autocorrelation
u 0.943
0.962 0.966 0.968 0.970 0.971
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
v 0.944
0.847 0.880 0.900 0.912 0.919
(0.037) (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021)
v/u 0.945
0.935 0.946 0.953 0.957 0.959
(0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Correlation
coefficient
u, v -0.876
-0.780 -0.800 -0.813 -0.822 -0.827
(0.053) (0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
u, v/u -0.969
-0.914 -0.923 -0.929 -0.932 -0.935
(0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
v, v/u 0.968
0.967 0.969 0.971 0.972 0.973
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Table 8: Model statistics with different levels of working capital requirement; γ is the fraction of the total wage bill
a firm is required to borrow. Each reported statistic is the mean from 10,000 simulations. The standard deviation
across simulations are reported in parentheses.
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percent. The market tightness volatility is 106 percent of the OLS regression coefficient. Moreover, the
proposed modification either maintains or improves the autocorrelation and the correlation among the labor
market variables. These statistics are in line with their empirical counterparts. The robustness checks show
that these quantitative results continue to hold under a wide range of interest rate rule and monopolistic
competition specifications.
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